Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of work on the history of emotions and law has focused on wrongdoing and on activity in courtrooms. This is true for the medieval period as for others. 
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family or without, issues of emotion were likely to meet with issues of law. 4 Affection could be an appropriate motive for a grant, and emotion could also enter into grants in a variety of other ways. 5 A famous charter from mid-twelfth-century
England presents the son's obligation to maintain his father's gift to a church in emotive terms, even if without specific emotion words -indeed emotional force is conveyed through legal imagery:
if this man's heir should try to take away the alms which is interposed as a bridge between his father and Paradise, by which his father may be able to pass over, the heir, so far as he may, is disinheriting his father from the kingdom of heaven, and therefore by right shall not obtain the remaining inheritance, since he who has killed his father has proved himself no son. 6 Furthermore, certainly at the time of this charter, crucial aspects of the alienability of land were not a matter of fixed, hard rules. Rather there was room for negotiation, and also for problems to arise, notably through conflicting views of reasonable practice. In the same charter, the donor is made to say:
I have done this by the advice and with the approval of many wise men, moved especially by the exhortation, requests and counsel of the lord Theobald, archbishop of Canterbury and primate of all England, who showed me by the most reasonable and unanswerable arguments (racionabilibus et uerissimis assercionarum) that it is most just that a noble and generous man who has a fief of six knights should bestow not only the third part of a knight's land on God and the holy church for the health of his own soul and his kin's, but the whole of a knight's land or more than that. Essays in Honour of Sir James Holt, Cambridge, 1994, 173-197 . 5 See Curia Regis Rolls, London, 1922-present, vol.1, 389, for a woman in a 1201 case saying that she had been persuaded into a grant by a mixture of threats, tricks, and sweet-talking, such that she was persuaded that she loved the grantee, and he loved her. 6 Sir Frank Stenton, The First Century of English Feudalism, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1961, 38-40, 260-261.
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Clearly in this case there was no simple formula for how much might be given to the church. It was a matter for persuasion by the greatest prelate in the land, suggesting that either donor, or other parties, or both, may have had potentially conflicting interests in, and attachments to, the land. Use of the adjective 'reasonable
[racionabilis]' could indicate that one method of persuasion that the archbishop used was to differentiate in carefully logical fashion what was proper from what was emotionally desired by the parties who needed persuading; at the same time, the archbishop was selling his ideas in an emotional fashion, in his appeal to close family bonds.
The discussion of alienation in Book VII of the lawbook known as Glanvill (c.
1188) contains much that sounds purely technical law but emotion too is mentioned.
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The anonymous author operates within a framework of reasonableness as to the amount that is alienable. He is particularly concerned with situations where disputes might arise, where there might be a perception of unreasonableness. In such circumstances emotional expectation and legal norm might come into conflict.
Glanvill distinguishes between the man who has only land that he has inherited, the man who has only land that he has acquired, and the man who has both.
In the case of the man who has only inherited land, the author confronts an apparent anomaly, where law and expected emotion conflict. The landholder can, as has been said, give a certain part of that inheritance to any stranger he wishes. However, if he has several legitimate sons, he can hardly give any part of the inheritance to a younger son without the heir's consent; for if this were allowed, the disinheritance of eldest sons would often occur, because of the They had to examine not just whether the man was guilty or not, but whether a malicious accusation had been brought purely out of hatred and spite -many a truthful accusation may have had at least an element of hatred to it -and then further into aspects of that hatred and spite.
The second form of procedure was the exception de odio et atia. 36 This was only used with respect to appeals, not presentments, but could be used regarding other felony accusations as well as those of homicide. The appellor brought his accusation; the defendant responded that the accusation was brought 'out of hatred and spite'.
This issue was then put to a jury; interestingly, even though felony cases brought by appeal should in the end be decided by trial by battle, people did not simply rely on
God's omniscience to produce the correct judgment. In cases at a central court, there would be need of a specially set up enquiry. 37 If the case was being held at the eyre, the presentment jury might act, although, as we shall see shortly, a special enquiry might be obtained from the king by payment. The jurors were asked whether it was a 'true appeal' -i.e. one brought in good faith -or was brought through hatred and spite. If the former, the case proceeded to the normal proof. If the latter, the appeal was reported either in terms of 'hatred and spite' or in terms of injustice without mentioning hatred and spite. Such amounted to a 'not guilty' verdict, an acquittal, and on some occasions the accused was specifically said to be 'quit'. As with the writ, then, the jury was not being asked about the emotions involved in a proper appeal, but was identifying purely malicious appeals using the terminology of emotions.
Case records show how such accusations and exceptions could be tied up with underlying disputes:
35 Note e.g. the works of Bartlett and Smail cited in fnn. 000, 000. The publishers' copyeditor may insist on short titles here, but we'll wait and see. 36 An 'exception' was a plea by the defendant that his opponent's accusation, complaint, or claim was inapplicable to the case, for reasons of fact or law; the defendant should not, therefore, be required to make a formal defence to the accusation, complaint, or claim. there took in robbery four swords and four hatchets and two bows and fifteen arrows and two sheets and five ells of linen cloth, and his father's charters concerning his inheritance. This happened in such a way that the knights of the neighbourhood came there and found Andrew with his force of men in that house.
Andrew came and denied robbery and felony and besieging of the house and ejection of the father and his men, but acknowledged that Thorold was his uncle, the son of a priest, in such a way that the land concerned should descend to him after Thorold's death, and that when he was approaching death, Andrew kept himself in that house without any force, as in the house that ought to descend to him from his uncle, and he kept himself in that house.
[Postscript] Andrew gives ten marks to the lord king to have his judgment swiftly and to have an enquiry whether this appeal was made 41 In this instance, however, it seems that the procedure retained its original purpose, at least in the period covered by this paper. It could be quite costly, as in the ten marks that Andrew of Edlington had to pay the king (a mark was two-thirds of a pound). And it was used not just against male but also against female appellors, whose appeals did not result in trial by battle.
The exception, therefore, had not been transformed simply into a method of escaping a duel, but rather retained its purpose of countering appeals brought maliciously out of 'hatred and spite'.
IV. OFFICIAL RECORDS FROM ROYAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS
It is notable that even in accounts of proceedings de odio et atia the plea rolls of the king's courts actually mention little about emotions displayed in the courtroom or more generally once a case had been brought; rather they describe the events behind the appeal. In practice, those making the enquiries must have looked into matters of emotion, and made decisions arising therefrom. Yet the plea rolls are characterized in these matters as elsewhere by a significant degree of impersonality. 42 Such would be a worthy subject for a separate study, albeit a necessarily speculative one.
Instead, here let us look at two cases, one criminal, the other concerning land, for which accounts survive both inside and outside plea rolls. Our first case is that of Thomas of Elderfield, which Paul Hyams has made well known. 45 We have both a monastic narrative account, from a Worcester collection of the miracles of St
Wulfstan, and an official legal record, from the rolls of the itinerant justices visiting Gloucestershire in 1221. 46 The miracle is the restoration of the convicted man's testicles and eyes, which he had lost in the punishment of mutilation; not surprisingly, the account of the man after his punishment and of the miraculous restoration is within that field, law in court as it was supposed to be and law in court as it might be in practice.
Examination of the plea rolls therefore confirms the impression gained from 70 There are also comments on how witnesses gave testimony, comments that may suggest an effect on the weight that would be given to their words: one 'seemed … to speak lukewarmly, and not constantly, and to offer a premeditated speech', another -whose testimony varied -spoke 'timidly and with trepidation'. Here an assessment of the emotional state of the witness, based on somatic as well as verbal signs, could have some legal consequence.
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Besides depositions we have also a notification of complaints of the prior and convent of Rochester against their bishop. Here emotion language is used to give force to the complaints:
Sighing from the lake of miseries and oppressions, looking to the equity of your pondering, in the bowels of mercy of our God we ask relief from this grave yoke, that having the fear of God here before your eyes, here the rights 68 Select Cases, A.4 (at 14). Note also e.g. hatred mentioned in A.6 (at 19) as part of the explanation as to why a man did not want his kinsfolk at his side at his espousal.
69 Ibid., A.4 (at 12; see also 13). So, as in the common law records, we find in the ecclesiastical court records that mentions of emotion and use of an emotional vocabulary depended on situation.
They are more present, as one would expect, in petitioning, and similarly appear in requests, petitions, and complaints to the king. 74 In witness depositions to ecclesiastical courts appear the type of back-story largely absent from common law records, and these sometimes include descriptions of emotion or emotion language, with the narrative being constructed in a way that may have been intended to affect the emotions of those hearing the case. 75 Emotions are largely absent from issues of less directly, it should also be of major interest the historian of emotions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article has been concerned with the relationship of emotions and law in the were not covered by routine procedures in the way that other tenants' litigation had come to be, and their treatment might anyway be more politically charged. 
